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Abstract 
This paper analyses the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA). It argues that this new legal 
framework, which has the objective to establish a unique form of political association and economic 
integration, is characterised by three specific features: comprehensiveness, complexity and 
conditionality. After a brief background of the EU-Ukraine relations, the following aspects are 
scrutinised: legal basis and objectives, institutional framework and mechanisms of enhanced 
conditionality and legislative approximation. In addition, constitutional challenges for the effective 
implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA are discussed. Based upon a comparison with other EU 
external agreements, it is demonstrated that the AA is an innovative legal instrument providing for a 
new type of integration without membership. 
Keywords 
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 1 
THE EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT: ASSESSMENT OF AN INNOVATIVE LEGAL 
INSTRUMENT 
Guillaume Van der Loo, Peter Van Elsuwege and Roman Petrov  
Introduction 
 
“We are here to sign the Association Agreements between the European Union and each of your 
countries. These are not just any other agreements - but milestones in the history of our relations 
and for Europe as a whole. In Kiev and elsewhere, people gave their lives for this closer link to the 
European Union. We will not forget them”.
1
 
This statement of the President of the European Council was made on 27 June 2014 at the signing 
ceremony of the bilateral Association Agreements (AAs) between the European Union (EU) and 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. This new generation of AAs will replace the outdated Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) as the basic legal framework for the bilateral relations between the 
EU and those countries. 
According to Herman Van Rompuy, the AA with Ukraine – which served to a large extent as a 
template for the agreements with Moldova and Georgia
2
 – is “the most advanced agreement of its kind 
ever negotiated by the European Union”.3 A cursory reading of the agreement, counting around 2,140 
pages in the Official Journal including 46 annexes, 3 protocols and a joint declaration, already reveals 
that it is unprecedented both in terms of scope and level of detail.
4
 The agreement essentially aims to 
deepen the political and economic relations between Ukraine and the EU through the establishment of 
an enhanced institutional framework and innovative provisions on regulatory and legislative 
approximation. Of particular significance is the ambition to set up a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA), leading to “Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU internal market”.5 
                                                     
1
 European Council, ‘Statement at the signing ceremony of the Association Agreements with Georgia, Republic of Moldova 
and Ukraine’, Brussels, 27 June 2014, EUCO 137/14. Available at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143415.pdf>, accessed 30.06.2014. 
2
 However, in the light of the European Neighbourhood Policy’s (ENP) principles of differentiation and joint ownership, all 
AAs are tailored to the needs and requirements of the parties involved. Key differences between the EU-Ukraine AA and 
the Moldova or Georgia AAs are, for example, that Georgia is referred to in the preamble of the Georgia AA as an 
“Eastern European country” (emphasis added) and that both the Georgia and Moldova AAs do not include a non-
discrimination clause for treatment and mobility of workers, corresponding to Articles 17 and 18 of the EU-Ukraine AA. 
In the trade part, important differences are, inter alia, that approximation clauses in the area of competition and “internal 
market treatment” in the area of establishment are not foreseen under the Georgia and Moldova Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). Also the provisions on trade-related energy and intellectual property rights are less detailed 
in the Moldova and Georgia DCFTAs. 
3
 European Council, Press Remarks by H. Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, following the EU-Ukraine 
Summit, Brussels, 25 February 2013, EUCO 48/13. Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-13-
74_en.htm>, accessed 30.06.2014.  
4
 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine of the other part, 
OJ, 2014, L 161. 
5
 The explicit reference to “Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU Internal Market” as one of the AA’s objectives (Art. 1 
(d)) is quite remarkable. In comparison, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) and pre-accession 
instruments such as the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the Western Balkan countries do not 
include such a reference in their corresponding articles. For example, the objectives of the SAAs only aim “to promote 
harmonious economic relations and develop gradually a free trade area” (Art. 1(1)(f) EU-Serbia SAA, OJ, 2010, L 28/2). 
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Accordingly, the AA belongs to the selected group of “integration-oriented agreements”, i.e. 
agreements including principles, concepts and provisions of EU law which are to be interpreted and 
applied as if the third State is part of the EU.
6
 Such agreements are an exceptional phenomenon in the 
practice of the EU’s external action. Apart from the well-known multilateral examples of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) agreement, the Energy Community Treaty (EnC Treaty) and the European 
Common Aviation Area Agreement (ECAA),
7
 a limited number of specific bilateral agreements also 
deserve this qualification.
8
  
It will be argued that the EU-Ukraine AA is unique in many respects and, therefore, provides a new 
type of integration without membership.
9
 The agreement can be characterised by three specific 
features: comprehensiveness, complexity and conditionality.  
First, the AA is a comprehensive framework agreement covering the entire spectrum of EU-Ukraine 
relations. Hence, it includes provisions dealing with the whole array of EU activities, including 
cooperation and convergence in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as well as 
cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ).
10
 Moreover, due to the inclusion of 
provisions on nuclear energy and areas falling within Member State competences, the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and all EU Member States are also contracting parties to the 
agreement. Whereas the Treaty of Lisbon significantly facilitates the conclusion of what used to be 
called ‘cross-pillar agreements’, the comprehensive scope of the agreement necessarily generates a 
certain complexity. For instance, the AA provisions dealing with the AFSJ do not bind the United 
Kingdom and Ireland as EU Member States as a result of the ‘opt-out’ granted under Protocol 21 to 
the EU Treaties. Yet, those countries are bound as separate contracting parties due to the mixed nature 
of the agreement and can decide to ‘opt in’ as part of the EU after notifying Ukraine. A specific 
regime also applies to Denmark, in accordance with Protocol 22 to the EU Treaties. The 
comprehensive scope of the AA also implies that in certain areas of cooperation there is an overlap 
with existing agreements and obligations. Pursuant to Article 479 of the EU-Ukraine AA, such 
(existing) agreements “shall be considered part of the overall bilateral relations as governed by this 
Agreement and as forming part of a common institutional framework.” As a result, the AA includes 
various provisions clarifying the relationship with other bilateral and multilateral agreements aiming to 
ensure a coherent legal framework for EU-Ukraine relations.
11
 This again contributes to the 
complexity of the agreement, for instance as far as dispute settlement mechanisms are concerned (cf. 
infra). 
Second, the complexity of the AA is not only related to its comprehensive scope but also to its level of 
ambition, in particular the aim to achieve Ukraine’s economic integration in the EU internal market 
through the establishment of a DCFTA. The objective of ‘deep’ integration requires extensive 
(Contd.)                                                                  
The EMAAs aim to “establish the conditions for the gradual liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital” (Art. 
1(2) EU-Morocco EMAA, OJ, 2000, L 70/2). 
6
 The expression “integration-oriented agreements” is borrowed from M. Maresceau. See: M. Maresceau, “Les accords 
d’intégration dans les relations de proximité de l’Union européenne”, in Claude Blumann (Ed.), Les frontières de l’Union 
européenne (Bruylant, 2013), 151-192. 
7
 S. Blockmans, B. Van Vooren, ‘Revitalizing the European ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’: The Case for Legally 
Binding Sectoral Multilateralism’, 17(4) European Foreign Affairs Review (2012), pp. 577-604. For texts, see OJ, 2006, 
L 198/18 (EnC Treaty) and OJ, 2006, L 285/3 (ECAA). 
8
 For a comprehensive overview, see M. Maresceau, op. cit. supra note 6. 
9
 A. Lazowski, ‘Enhanced Multilateralism and Enhanced Bilateralism: Integration without Membership in the European 
Union’, 45 (2) Common Market Law Review (2008), 1433-1458; G. Van der Loo, ‘The EU-Ukraine Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area: a coherent mechanism for legislative approximation?’, in P. Van Elsuwege, R. Petrov 
(Eds.) Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union. 
Towards a Common Regulatory Space?, (Routledge, 2014), 63-88. 
10
 See Title II and III of the EU-Ukraine AA. 
11
 See e.g. Art. 265 on relationship with the WTO and Art. 278 on relationship with the EnC Treaty.  
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legislative and regulatory approximation including sophisticated mechanisms to secure the uniform 
interpretation and effective implementation of relevant EU legislation.
12
 
Last but not least, the EU-Ukraine AA is based on a strict conditionality approach. The preamble to 
the agreement explicitly states that “political association and economic integration of Ukraine within 
the European Union will depend on progress in the implementation of the current agreement as well as 
Ukraine’s track record in ensuring respect for common values, and progress in achieving convergence 
with the EU in political, economic and legal areas.”13 This link between the third country’s 
performance and the deepening of the EU’s engagement is a key characteristic of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Whereas this principle has so-far 
been applied on the basis of soft-law instruments such as Action Plans and the Association Agenda, it 
is now encapsulated in a legally binding bilateral agreement.
14
 
In what follows the specific features of the EU-Ukraine AA are analysed in more detail in order to 
illustrate that the agreement opens a new chapter in the EU’s relations with its neighbouring countries 
and, more generally, in its external relations practice. After a brief introduction to the background of 
the new AA, its legal basis and objectives are discussed. Subsequently, specific attention is devoted to 
the institutional framework, mechanisms of conditionality and the procedures for legislative 
approximation and dispute settlement. A final section deals with the constitutional challenges for the 
effective implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA. 
 
Background of EU-Ukraine relations: From Partnership and Cooperation to 
Association 
 
The AA will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) as the basic legal framework 
of EU-Ukraine relations.
15
 The PCA, which was signed in 1994, entered into force in March 1998 for 
an initial period of ten years.
16
 Pursuant to Article 101, the agreement is automatically extended each 
year unless either side informs the other party of its denunciation at least six months before the expiry 
date. Whereas, from a legal point of view, the PCA could therefore continue to apply without formal 
problems, a revision of the legal framework was urgently needed.
17
 Due to internal developments in 
both the EU and Ukraine, several provisions of the PCA are out of date and no longer reflect the 
current ambition of the bilateral relationship. The preamble and Article 1, for instance, refer to 
Ukraine as “a country with an economy in transition”, which is no longer appropriate after the 
country’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2008. 
Moreover, the agreement includes general and broadly defined provisions on economic co-operation
18
 
but stops short of any regional trade integration. Article 4 PCA only provides that the parties consider 
                                                     
12
 A. Lazowski, op. cit. supra note 9, 1433. 
13
 Emphasis added. 
14
 See e.g. the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda (EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, ‘Recommendation on the implementation 
of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement’, UE-
UA 1057/0923, 23 November 2009, updated in 2011). 
15
 Art. 479 EU-Ukraine AA.  
16
 Council and Commission Decision of 26 January 1998 on the conclusion of the PCA between the EC and their Member 
States and Ukraine, OJ, 1998, L 49. 
17
 A similar reasoning applies for the PCAs with Russia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. With Belarus, a PCA 
was signed in 1995 but never entered into force due to political reasons. 
18
 The title “Economic Cooperation” in the PCA contains provisions on industrial cooperation, investment promotion and 
protection, public procurement, co-operation in the field of standards and conformity assessment, education and training, 
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“whether circumstances allow the beginning of negotiations on the establishment of a free trade 
area”.19 Like many other provisions of the agreement, this so-called ‘evolutionary clause’ is essentially 
a declaration of intent without any direct legal consequences. 
The minimalistic approach of the PCA is particularly well-illustrated as regards the objective of 
approximating Ukraine’s existing and future legislation to that of the EU. While recognizing that this 
process of legislative approximation is an important condition for strengthening the economic links 
between the parties, Article 51 PCA proclaims that Ukraine “shall endeavour to ensure that its 
legislation be gradually made compatible with that of the Community [now Union]”.20 This can hardly 
be regarded as a formal legal commitment. Its vague and open-ended formulation gave the Ukrainian 
authorities a large freedom to define the time-schedule and methods of implementation. There is only 
an obligation to act but without a requirement to achieve particular results or a sanction in case the 
approximation of laws obligation is not fulfilled. Moreover, the approximation clause includes a long 
list of “priority areas” for legislative action21 but fails to provide clear guidelines on the scope and 
content of the EU laws to be taken as the basis for approximation nor does it include a link with the 
objective to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the future.
22
 
The launch of the ENP in the wake of the EU’s eastward enlargement provided new impetus to EU-
Ukraine relations. In this context, the European Commission proposed to move beyond mere 
cooperation to a significant degree of economic integration in return for concrete progress in terms of 
legal approximation.
23
 In the short term, an ENP Action Plan – adopted with Ukraine in 2005 for a 
period of three years – laid down political and economic priorities for reform whereas the negotiation 
of a new bilateral framework agreement to replace the PCA was considered to be a long term 
objective.
24
 
Regarding the objective of trade liberalisation and economic integration, the first Commission 
Communications were ambitious but vague, stating that the ENP Partners should be offered “a 
prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market”.25 These ambitions were further developed in the 
context of the EU’s 2006 “Global Europe Strategy”, the new trade policy agenda set out by the 
European Commission.
26
 According to this new approach, the EU would seek to go beyond WTO 
commitments in promoting trade liberalisation and integration, by tackling issues which are not ready 
for multilateral discussion.
27
 This implies the ambition to conclude a new generation of comprehensive 
and ambitious free-trade agreements, including far-reaching liberalization of services and investment 
and the abolition of non-tariff barriers through regulatory convergence with regard to issues such as 
(Contd.)                                                                  
energy, environment, cooperation in science and technology, tourism, monetary policy, social cooperation, money 
laundering, regional development, information and communication, statistical cooperation, etc. 
19
 Art. 4 EU-Ukraine PCA. 
20
 Art. 51 EU-Ukraine PCA, emphasis added. 
21
 Art. 51 (2) EU-Ukraine PCA refers to customs law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, 
protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on competition, public procurement, protection of health 
and life of humans, animals and plants, the environment, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and 
standards, nuclear laws and transport. 
22
 R. Petrov, ‘Recent Developments in the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU law’, 8(1) European Foreign Affairs 
Review (2003), 125-141, at 131. 
23
 European Commission, ‘Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours’, COM (2003) 104 final, 11 March 2003. 
24
 In November 2009, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan was replaced by a bilateral Association Agenda (EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Council, ‘Recommendation on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the 
implementation of the Association Agreement’, UE-UA 1057/0923, 23 November 2009). 
25
 European Commission, op.cit., footnote 23, 10. 
26
 European Commission, ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’, COM (2006) 567 final, 4 October 2006. 
27
 Ibid., 7. 
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the protection of intellectual property rights, competition law, rules of origin, labour standards and 
environmental protection. At the end of 2006, the Commission announced its intention to negotiate 
“deep and comprehensive free trade agreements” (DCFTAs) with the EU’s neighbours including 
“substantially all trade in goods and services” and “strong legally-binding provisions on trade and 
economic regulatory issues”.28 
Against the political background of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine was the first ENP country to start 
negotiations on a new Association Agreement in March 2007 as part of a general revision of the 
bilateral legal framework. Negotiations on the DCFTA were only launched in February 2008 after 
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. A political agreement was reached in December 2011 and the AA 
was initialled in March 2012.
29
 On 15 May 2013, the Commission adopted the proposals for a Council 
Decision on the signing and conclusion of the EU-Ukraine AA.
30
 Nevertheless, this agreement was not 
immediately signed due to demands on behalf of the EU to abandon the practice of selective justice 
and to align the Ukrainian judiciary and law enforcement systems with European standards.
31
 
Eventually, on the eve of the EaP Summit in Vilnius, the Ukrainian Government decided to suspend 
the process of preparation for signature of the AA in order “to ensure the national security of Ukraine 
and to recover trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation”.32 Following this news, 
hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians went to the streets. The ensuing Maidan revolution led to the 
dismissal of President Victor Yanukovych on 22 February 2014 and the establishment of an Interim-
Government under the leadership of Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Proceeding with the signature of the EU-
Ukraine AA was a clear short-term objective for the new authorities in Kiev.
33
 
Despite the political pressure to act quickly, this was not an evident option. Under the Ukrainian 
Constitution, the President is responsible for the signature of international agreements.
34
 After the 
escape of Victor Yanukovych, Ukraine only had an acting President (Olexander Turchynov) who was 
appointed by the Parliament without elections. Taking into account the legal and political significance 
of the AA, including long-term and far-reaching commitments of legislative approximation with the 
EU, this clearly raised some questions of legitimacy. At the same time, there was also a growing 
understanding that a clear message of solidarity to the Ukrainian people was needed in light of the 
mounting Russian pressure on Crimea and the Eastern part of Ukraine. In this context, the EU Heads 
of State or Government announced on 6 March 2014 that “as a matter of priority” all the political 
chapters of the AA would be signed first. In addition, the adoption of autonomous trade measures 
“would allow Ukraine to benefit substantially from the advantages offered in the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area.”35 The signature of the political provisions of the AA effectively 
                                                     
28
 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’, COM (2006) 726 final, 4 December 2006, 4. 
29
 The DCFTA part was only initialled, after legal scrubbing, in July 2012. 
30
 European Commission, ‘Signature of Association Agreement with the EU will depend on Ukraine's performance’, Press 
Release, 15 May 2013, IP/13/436. 
31
 3209th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Council Conclusions on Ukraine, 10 December 2012  
32
 Decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from 21st November 2013, N 905-p. Arguably, the Ukrainian 
government’s decision cannot be disconnected from the Russian proposal to establish a Eurasian Union building upon the 
already existing customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. On the background of this initiative and its 
implications for EU-Ukraine relations, see: G. Van der Loo and P. Van Elsuwege, ‘Competing Paths of Regional 
Economic Integration in the Post-Soviet Space: Legal and Political Dilemmas for Ukraine’, 37 Review of Central and 
East European Law (2012), 421-447. 
33
 G. Gotev, ‘Ukraine ready to sign Association Agreement during March EU Summit’, Euractiv.com, 27 February 2014, 
available at <http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/ukraine-wants-sign-association-a-news-533818>, accessed 
30.06.2014. 
34
 Art. 106 (3) of the Ukrainian Constitution. 
35 Statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine, Brussels, 6 March 2014, available at 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141372.pdf>, accessed 30.06.2014. 
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took place on 21 March 2014
36
 and on 14 April 2014, after a ‘fast track’ approval process, the 
European Parliament and the Council adopted a Regulation “on the reduction or elimination of 
customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine.”37 Accordingly, Ukraine can benefit from the EU’s 
unilateral trade preferences in accordance with the schedule of concessions set in out in annex I-A of 
the AA in anticipation of the (provisional) application of the entire agreement.
38
 
It is noteworthy that the political and economic parts of the EU-Ukraine AA remain part of a single 
legal instrument.
39
 In other words, the partial signature of the agreement on 21 March 2014 may 
essentially be regarded as a political gesture underlining the parties’ commitment to shared values and 
the objectives of the envisaged association. The direct legal implications are fairly limited because the 
political provisions are rather general in nature. In addition to a list of general principles underlying 
the bilateral relationship, they include the establishment of a multi-level political dialogue and 
convergence in the field of CFSP. Moreover, this partial signature did not result in the entry into force 
of these ‘political’ chapters, neither to their provisional application. It was only after the final 
signature of the entire agreement on 27 June 2014 by the newly elected President Petro Poroshenko 
that the ratification procedure for the entire agreement could be initiated. Because the EU-Ukraine AA 
is a mixed agreement, which needs to be ratified by all 28 EU Member States, this procedure can take 
several years. In order to circumvent this long ratification procedure, Article 486 of the EU-Ukraine 
AA provides for the possibility of the provisional application of the agreement.
40
 Given the political 
significance of the EU-Ukraine AA, the Council agreed on an exceptional wide scope for provisional 
application, including, inter alia, the entire title on General Principles (Title I) and Financial 
Cooperation (Title VI), almost the entire DCFTA (Title IV), Institutional, General and Final 
Provisions (Title VII) and several provisions regarding political dialogue (Arts. 4-6), Justice, Freedom 
and Security (Arts. 14 and 19) and economic and sectoral cooperation.
41
 This broad scope could raise 
                                                     
36
 The ‘political provisions’ of the agreement which were signed on 21 March 2014 include the preamble, Article 1 
(objectives), Title I (general principles), II (Political dialogue and reform, political association cooperation and 
convergence in the field of CFSP) and VII (institutional, general and final provisions). See: Final Act of the Summit 
between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards the association 
agreement, available at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/association_agreement/final_act_text_en.pdf>, accessed 
30.06.2014. It must be noted that Title III (Justice, Freedom and Security) can also be considered as a ‘political chapter’ 
of the AA. However, several Member States opposed the signature of this chapter on 21 March 2014 as it includes 
‘sensitive’ provisions on treatment and mobility of workers and movement of persons (Arts. 17-19) (Interview with 
EEAS official, 22 April 2014). 
37
 Regulation (EU) No 374/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the reduction or 
elimination of customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine (OJ, 2014, L 118/1). 
38
 The unilateral trade preferences apply until the DCFTA part of the AA (provisionally) enters into force and in any case no 
later than 1 November 2014. It is noteworthy that the EU did not request a WTO waiver for the adoption of the 
autonomous measures (under Art. IX:3 WTO) because they anticipate the (provisional) application of the EU-Ukraine 
DCFTA. Hence, the EU’s démarche is deemed to be in conformity with GATT Article XXIV. See, on the development 
of this line of argumentation, the response of the Commission’s representative to questions during the meeting of the 
European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA), Brussels, 19-20 March, available at 
<http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/01/82/EU_18238/imfname_10451522.pdf>, accessed 30.06.2014. 
39
 Final Act of the Summit between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards 
the association agreement, available at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/association_agreement/final_act_text_en.pdf>, accessed 
30.06.2014. 
40
 For a detailed analysis of the provisional application of international agreements concluded by the EU, see C. Flaesch-
Mougin, I. Bosse-Platière, ‘L’application provisoire des accords de L’Union Européenne’, in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. 
Van Elsuwege, S. Adam (eds.), The European Union in the World. Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2014), 293-323. 
41
 Combined reading of the Council Decision 2014/295/EU of 17 March 2014 on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic 
Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards the Preamble, 
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questions on the provisional application of ‘mixed’ elements of the AA. In this view, it is stated in the 
Council Decisions on the signing of the AA that these listed provisions shall be applied on a 
provisional basis “only to the extent that they cover matters falling within the Union’s competence, 
including matters falling within the Union’s competence to define and implement a common foreign 
and security policy”.42 In addition, the Council, Commission and High Representative adopted a Joint 
Statement providing that the provisional application of the General Principles set down in Article 2 “is 
without prejudice to the division of competences between the Union and the Member States on the 
matters referred to therein”.43 
Legal Basis and Objectives  
The comprehensive and complex nature of the AA is reflected in the choice of legal basis. The 
Council Decision on the signing and provisional application of the political provisions, adopted on 17 
March 2014, combines the legal basis for EU action in the area of CFSP (Arts. 31(1) and 37 Treaty on 
the EU (TEU)) with the traditional provision on association (Art. 217 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU)).
44
 From a procedural point of view, the presence of a CFSP legal basis does not make a 
major difference because association agreements already require unanimity in the Council.
45
 
Moreover, the CFSP dimension of the AA is too limited to overrule Art. 218(6)a(i) TFEU which 
requires the consent of the European Parliament for the conclusion of association agreements.
46
 
Nevertheless, the combination of CFSP/TFEU legal bases may be regarded as a logical consequence 
of the continuing bipolarity of the EU’s external action as reflected in Article 40 TEU.47 The EU-
Ukraine AA is one of the first examples of this new practice, which stems from the Lisbon Treaty 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Article 1, and titles I, II and VII thereof (OJ, 2014, 161/1) and Council Decision […]/2014 on the signing, on behalf of 
the European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the 
European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards 
Title III, IV, V, VI and VII of the Agreement, as well as the related Annexed and Protocols (not yet pubished in the OJ, 
on file with the authors). It must be noted that the Commission even proposed a broader scope for provisional application, 
including, inter alia, the entire Title on Political Dialogue and Reform, Political Association, Cooperation and 
Convergence in the field of Foreign and Security Policy (Title II) (European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council 
Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement 
between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part’, COM(2013) 289 
final, 15 May 2013). 
42
 See Art. 4 Council Decision 2014/295/EU, ibid. 
43
 General Secretariat of the Council, ‘Relations with Ukraine - Joint Statement in the Council minutes’, Brussels, 20 June 
2014, Interinstitutional File 2013/0155 (on file with the authors). In addition, this Statement declares that the provisional 
application of cooperation in Art. 14 of the EU-Ukraine AA on the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms “does not constitute an exercise by the European Union of competence pursuant to Title V of Part 
III [TFEU]”. On this issue, see also the Statements made by Hungary and Portugal and the Council. For an analysis of the 
provisional application of mixed agreements, see F. Hoffmeister, ‘Curse or Blessing? Mixed Agreements in the Recent 
Practice of the European Union and its Member States’, in in C. Hillion, P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements 
Revisited, (Hart Publishing, 2010), 257. 
44
 Council Decision 2014/295/EU of 17 March 2014, op. cit., footnote 41. 
45
 Art. 218 (8) TFEU. 
46
 According to Art. 218(6) TFEU an association agreement can only be concluded without the consent of the European 
Parliament if it relates “exclusively” to CFSP. In recent Case C-658/11, Commission v. Council, the Court of Justice 
clarified that the substantive legal basis of a Council decision adopted for the conclusion of an international agreement 
determines the procedures to followed. Hence, only when the substantive legal basis exclusively relates to the area of 
CFSP, the European Parliament does not play a role in this process.   
47
 See, on this new form of mixity: A. Dashwood, “The continuing bipolarity of EU external action”, in: I. Govaere, E. 
Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege, S. Adam (eds.), The European Union in the World. Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014), 3-16 and, in the same volume, S. Adam, “The Legal Basis of International 
Agreements of the European Union in the Post-Lisbon Era”, 65-86.  
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amendments to the procedural code for negotiating and concluding international agreements on behalf 
of the EU.
48
 
A more controversial question concerned the adoption of two separate Council Decisions for the 
signature and provisional application of the remaining titles of the EU-Ukraine AA on 27 June 2014.
49
 
Despite the Commission proposal for a single decision on the basis of Article 217 TFEU, the Council 
opted to ‘split off’ the provisions relating to the treatment of third-country nationals legally employed 
as workers in the territory of the parties (Art. 17 EU-Ukraine AA). The latter formed the subject of a 
separate Council Decision adopted on the basis of Article 79(2)(b) TFEU.
50
 The main reason for this 
complexity is the specific status of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the EU competences 
in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). Pursuant to Protocol 21 to the Treaty of Lisbon, 
both countries have the discretionary power to decide whether or not they want to take part in the 
adoption of legislative acts under this title.
51
 Taking into account that Article 17 of the EU-Ukraine 
AA falls within the scope of the AFSJ, in particular Article 79(2)(b) TFEU on the rights of third-
country nationals residing legally in the EU Member States, a separate Council Decision was deemend 
necessary. Nevertheless, this option is not undisputable. Article 17 AA is an integral part of the 
estabished association and it seems far-fetched to argue that the aim and content of this provision is 
distinct from and independent of the aim and content of the other provisions of the AA. Moreover, in 
its recent judgment Commission v Council (Case C-377/12), the Court of Justice of the EU (Court of 
Justice) considered the addition of specific legal bases relating to readmission of third-country 
nationals (Art. 79(3) TFEU, transport (Arts 91 and 100 TFEU) and environment (Art. 191(4) TFEU) 
unnecessary and unlawful for the signature of a Framework Agreement on Partnership and 
Cooperation between the EU and the Republic of the Philipiness.
52
 In the Court’s view, the broad 
scope of Articles 207 and 209 TFEU dealing, respectively, with common commercial policy and 
development cooperation was sufficient to cover the entire agreement. Of course, the context and the 
objectives of the EU-Ukraine AA are entirely different. Nevertheless, the argument may be made that 
Article 217 TFEU on association is a ‘catch-all’ provision, which does not require the adoption of a 
separate Council decision related to one specific provision of the agreement. This interpretation was 
not only strongly supported by the European Commission
53
 but also by several Member States.
54
 
Taking into account the political importance of the EU-Ukraine AA, it seems unlikely that the final 
decision to use a ‘split’ legal basis will be challenged before the Court of Justice. 
 Remarkably, the Council Decisions on the signature of the provisional application of the AA remain 
silent on Article 8 TEU.
55
 The latter provision, entitled ‘The Union and its neighbours’, was 
                                                     
48
 The unified procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on behalf of the EU is laid down in 
Art. 218 TFEU. 
49
 This concerns Title III (freedom, security and justice), IV (trade and trade-related matters), V (economic and sector 
cooperation) and VI (financial cooperation with anti-fraud provisions). 
50
 Council Decision […]/2014 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Association Agreement between the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of 
the other part, as regards the provisions relating to the treatment of third-country nationals legally employed as workers in 
the territory of the other party (not yet published in the OJ, on file with the authors). 
51
 Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, 
OJ, 2010, C 83/295. 
52
 Case C-377/12, Commission v Council, Judgment of 11 June 2014, nyr. 
53
 In a Statement on this Council Decision, the Commission declared that it has mode one proposal for one Decision based on 
Art. 217 TFEU and, therefore, “disagrees with the addition of legal bases, in particular Article 79(2)(b), with the effect in 
particular of splitting the Decision” (General secretariat of the Council, op. cit. supra footnote 43) 
54
 For example, Austria, Italy, Romania and the Czech Republic adopted Statements in support of Art. 217 TFEU as a single 
legal basis, ibid. 
55
 Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Association Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, COM (2013) 290 final. 
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introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon and endows the Union with an explicit competence to conclude 
specific agreements with neighbouring countries.
56
 Article 8 TEU envisages a duty of the EU to 
“develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity 
and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful 
relations based on co-operation”. Both procedural and political arguments may help to explain the 
absence of Article 8 TEU as a legal basis for the new AA with Ukraine. 
First, the procedure for concluding association agreements under Article 217 TFEU is well-defined 
whereas the EU Treaties do not include any procedural guidelines for agreements to be concluded 
under Article 8 TEU. Taking into account also its unusual location under Title I ‘Common Provisions’ 
of the TEU, it is even questionable whether Article 8 TEU can be used as an autonomous substantive 
legal basis. Rather, it may be regarded as a mainly political instrument alongside the substantive legal 
provisions on EU external action in the TFEU. In any event, from a legal point of view, a reference to 
Article 8 TEU is not required for the conclusion of an association agreement, even when the partner is 
a neighbouring country of the Union. 
Second, anything less than formal association based on Article 217 TFEU would not be perceived by 
the Eastern neighbours as an enhancement of their existing contractual relations.
57
 In contrast to 
Article 217 TFEU, Article 8 TEU has a clear finalité, i.e. “to establish an area of prosperity and good 
neighbourliness characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”. This focus on 
‘good neighbourliness’ sits uncomfortably with the European aspirations of certain Eastern partners, in 
particular Ukraine. In this context, it is noteworthy that from the very start of the negotiations, the 
Ukrainian authorities opposed against the use of the ‘neighbourhood’ label for the new agreement 
arguing that Ukraine is a part of Europe and not of the European neighbourhood.
58
 Only after a period 
of uncertainty about the legal status of what was diplomatically called an ‘enhanced agreement’, a 
Joint Declaration adopted on the occasion of the September 2008 EU-Ukraine Summit made an end to 
all speculations as it unequivocally provided that “the new agreement between the European Union 
and Ukraine will be an association agreement”.59 This offer was later extended to all Eastern 
Partnership countries.
60
 
Arguably, this evolution of the ENP has implications for the potential use of Article 8 TEU. Whereas 
this article was introduced as a basis for the conclusion of special ‘neighbourhood agreements’, the 
explicit offer to negotiate and conclude formal association agreements makes it difficult if not 
impossible to avoid the traditional provision of Article 217 TFEU.
61
 
                                                     
56
 For an analysis of Art. 8 TEU, see e.g. R. Petrov and P. Van Elsuwege, ‘Article 8 TEU: Towards a New Generation of 
Agreements with the Neighbouring Countries of the European Union?’, 36 European Law Review (2011), 688-703; C. 
Hillion, ‘Anatomy of EU norm export towards the neighbourhood: The impact of Article 8 TEU’, in P. Van Elsuwege 
and R. Petrov (eds.), Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the 
European Union: Towards a Common Regulatory Space?, (Routledge, 2014), 13-20. 
57
 C. Hillion, ‘Mapping-out the new contractual relations between the European Union and its neighbours – Learning from 
the EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement’, 12 European Foreign Affairs Review (2007), 175. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 EU-Ukraine Summit, Joint Declaration, 9 September 2008, 12812/08 (Presse 247). It is noteworthy that the European 
Parliament also did not consider Art. 8 TEU as a necessary legal basis (Report containing the European Parliament’s 
recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the negotiations of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement, 22 November 2011 (2011/2132(INI))). 
60
 Eastern Partnership Summit, Joint Declaration, Prague, 7 May 2009, 8435/09 (Presse 78). 
61
 Arguably, Article 8 TEU could be reserved for agreements with neighbouring countries that are not necessarily interested 
in formal association and/or that do not aim for a recognition of their ‘European perspective’ like Russia, Switzerland and 
European micro-states. On this point, see R. Petrov and P. Van Elsuwege, op. cit. supra footnote 56. 
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The conclusion of association agreements with European countries is often perceived as a stepping-
stone towards EU membership.
62
 For example, after the signing ceremony on 27 June 2014, the heads 
of State or Government of the three associated countries linked the conclusion of the AAs with their 
(long-term) EU membership aspirations.
63
 However, there is no automatic link between association 
and accession prospects. The AA with Ukraine carefully avoids any direct reference to future 
membership perspectives for Ukraine but somewhat diplomatically observes that “the European Union 
acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice”. This 
formulation is somewhat reminiscent of the formula used in the old Europe Agreements with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
64
 It does not entail any legal or political commitment towards 
further enlargement on behalf of the Union. The AA is thus not a pre-accession agreement such as the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the Western Balkan countries,
65
 however, it 
neither excludes a membership perspective. In this view, the preamble states that “this Agreement 
shall not prejudice and leaves open future developments in EU-Ukraine relations.”66 In addition, the 
parties explicitly recognize that “Ukraine as a European country shares a common history and 
common values with the Member States of the EU and is committed to promoting those values.” The 
parallels with the first sentence of Article 49 TEU are obvious. Moreover, it is noteworthy that several 
provisions reflect the formulation of the Copenhagen pre-accession criteria. Political criteria such as 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are not only defined as ‘essential elements’ of the AA,67 they are also an integral part of the 
established political dialogue
68
 and cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice.
69
 At the 
economic level, the establishment of a DCFTA is regarded as an instrument “to complete [Ukraine’s] 
transition into a functioning market economy”.70 Last but not least, the entire agreement is based on 
Ukraine’s commitment to achieve “convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas”. 
Nevertheless, the AA does not aim at the preparation of Ukraine’s accession to the EU but at the 
establishment of “close and privileged links”.71 In other words, the key objective of the AA is to 
ensure Ukraine’s partial integration in the EU without offering any concrete membership perspective. 
It is well known that such a process raises significant challenges in terms of the EU acquis export and, 
in particular, for the uniform interpretation and application of the shared legal framework within legal 
                                                     
62
 D. Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (Sheffield Academic Press, 1999).  
63
 A. Rettman, ‘Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine cement EU ties’, EUobserver, 27 June 2014, available at 
<http://euobserver.com/foreign/124792> accessed 30.06.2014.  
64
 For instance, in the preamble to the EA with Poland the parties recognized “the fact that the final objective of Poland is to 
become a member of the Community and that this association […] will help to achieve this objective”. In other words, 
accession was regarded as a clear ambition of the associated states but not as a mutual objective. See: B. Lippert, 
‘Shaping and Evaluating the Europe Agreements – The Community Side’, in B. Lippert, H. Schneider (Eds.), Monitoring 
Association and Beyond: The European Union and the Visegrad States (Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 227-229. 
65
 The SAAs explicitly refer to the Western Balkan countries’ status as “a potential candidate for EU membership”. Also the 
Association Agreement with Turkey is conceived to “facilitate the accession of Turkey to the [Union] at a later date”. 
66
 As a reaction to the turbulent ‘Maidan protests’ and the following events, the Council emphasised on several occasions 
that “the Association Agreement does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine cooperation” (e.g. Foreign Affairs 
Council Meeting, ‘Conclusions on Ukraine’, 10 February 2014). Also at the signing ceremony on 27 June 2014, H. Van 
Rompuy stated that “these agreements are not the final stage of our cooperation” (op. cit. supra footnote 1). These 
statements can be considered as a careful attempt by the (European) Council to support the pro-EU forces in Ukraine with 
an EU-perspective while avoiding explicit references to EU accession. A stronger EU membership perspective was 
contested by several Member States such as France and the Netherlands, available at 
<http://euobserver.com/foreign/123078>, accessed 30.06.2014. 
67
 Preamble EU-Ukraine AA. 
68
 Art. 6 EU-Ukraine AA. 
69
 Art. 14 EU-Ukraine AA. 
70
 Art. 1(2)d EU-Ukraine AA. 
71
 Art. 1(2)(a) EU-Ukraine AA.  
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systems of third countries.
72
 For this purpose, the AA with Ukraine introduces a reinforced 
institutional framework, enhanced forms of conditionality and sophisticated mechanisms for legal 
approximation and dispute settlement which are distinct from other existing models of integration 
without membership. 
A Reinforced Institutional Framework 
The EU-Ukraine AA establishes a multi-level institutional framework that is based on practices of 
other EU association agreements but bears some considerable novelties. Summit meetings at the 
highest political level shall take place on an annual basis providing overall guidance for the 
implementation of the agreement and an opportunity to discuss issues of mutual interest.
73
 This is a 
confirmation of an already existing practice even though the EU-Ukraine PCA did not include such an 
explicit provision. A more significant development for the EU-Ukraine relations is the creation of an 
Association Council, meeting at Ministerial level, with decision-making capacities.
74
 The Association 
Council plays a crucial role in the process of legislative approximation. It operates as a forum for 
exchange of information on EU and Ukrainian legislative acts and is competent to update or amend the 
agreement’s annexes to keep pace with evolutions in EU law.75 An Association Committee with 
representatives at senior civil servant level assists the Association Council in the performance of its 
duties.
76
 Moreover, specific sub-committees can be established.
77
 With regard to the DCFTA, a 
specific role is played by the Trade Committee and specialised sub-committees dealing with issues 
such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), geographical indications or trade and sustainable 
development (see infra). Continuing the existing practice under the EU-Ukraine PCA, a Parliamentary 
Association Committee exchanges views and can make recommendations to the Association 
Council.
78
 A complete novelty in the EU’s association practice is the introduction of a bilateral Civil 
Society Platform consisting of members of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), on 
the one hand, and representatives of civil society on the side of Ukraine, on the other.
79
 Civil society 
cooperation forms a specific chapter of the AA and aims, amongst others, to ensure a better mutual 
knowledge and understanding between the parties.
80
 Civil Society institutions are expected to play a 
role in the field of trade and sustainable development
81
 and to be involved in social and cultural 
dialogues.
82
 This civil society component reflects its importance within the framework of the Eastern 
Partnership and complements the multilateral Civil Society Forum that was established after the 2009 
Prague Eastern Partnership Summit.
83
 
                                                     
72
 A. Lazowski, op. cit. supra note 9, p. 1433. 
73
 Art. 460 EU-Ukraine AA. 
74
 Under the EU-Ukraine PCA there was only a Co-operation Council which could only adopt recommendations but no 
binding decisions. 
75
 Art. 463 EU-Ukraine AA. Specific procedures are applicable with regard to legislative approximation in areas related to 
the DCFTA, see G. Van der Loo, op. cit. supra note 9. 
76
 Art. 464 EU-Ukraine AA. 
77
 Art. 466 EU-Ukraine AA.  
78
 Art. 467 EU-Ukraine AA.  
79
 Art. 469 EU-Ukraine AA.  
80
 Chapter 26, including Arts 443-445 of the EU-Ukraine AA. 
81
 Art. 299 EU-Ukraine AA 
82
 Art. 421 and 438 EU-Ukraine AA. 
83
 More details on the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum are available at<http://www.eap-csf.eu>, accessed 
30.06.2014. 
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Enhanced Conditionality in the EU-Ukraine AA 
 
Conditionality is one of the key strategic tools of the ENP and it is, therefore, no surprise that this 
instrument also occupies a prominent place in the EU-Ukraine AA. Two different forms of 
conditionality can be distinguished. On the one hand, the AA includes several provisions related to 
Ukraine’s commitment to the common European values of democracy, rule of law and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (‘common values’ conditionality). On the other hand, the part 
on the DCFTA is based on an explicit ‘market access’ conditionality implying that Ukraine will only 
be granted additional access to a section of the EU Internal Market if the EU decides, after a strict 
monitoring procedure, that Ukraine successfully implemented its legislative approximation 
commitments. Both forms of conditionality bear some revolutionary features in comparison to other 
external agreements concluded between the EU and third countries. 
Common values conditionality 
 
International agreements concluded on behalf of the EU include standard conditionality clauses. In 
general, an ‘essential element clause’ defining the core common values of the relationship is combined 
with a ‘suspension’ clause including a procedure to suspend the agreement in case of violation of those 
essential elements.
84
 Such a mechanism is also included in the EU-Ukraine AA.
85
 Yet, the common 
values conditionality in the EU-Ukraine AA differs from similar provisions included in, for instance, 
the SAAs with the Western Balkans. First, in addition to the standard reference to democratic 
principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms as defined by international legal instruments 
(Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the UN Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms),
86
 a specific 
reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms is included in Article 6 AA on “dialogue and 
cooperation on domestic reform”87 and in Article 14 AA dealing with EU-Ukraine cooperation on 
justice, freedom and security.
88
 Second, the essential elements of the EU-Ukraine AA contain common 
values that go beyond classical human rights and also include very strong security elements such as 
the “promotion of respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of 
borders and independence, as well as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
related materials and their means of delivery”.89 Third, “the principles of free market economy” as 
well as a list of other issues such as “rule of law, the fight against corruption, the fight against the 
different forms of trans-national organised crime and terrorism, the promotion of sustainable 
                                                     
84
 See L. Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (OUP, 2005). 
85
 Art. 2 in conjunction with Art. 478 EU-Ukraine AA. 
86
 Art. 2 EU-Ukraine AA. The same principles and legal instruments are mentioned in Art. 2 of the SAA with Serbia (op. cit. 
supra note 5). 
87
 This dialogue foresees that the parties “shall cooperate in order to ensure that their internal policies are based on principles 
common to the parties in particular stability and effectiveness of democratic institutions and the rule of law and on 
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
88
 Remarkably, Art. 80 of the SAA with Serbia only refers to “reinforcement of institutions and the rule of law” in relation to 
cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security whereas the largely Art. 14 of the EU-Ukraine AA is entitled 
“rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” [emphasis added]. It also explicitly provides that 
“respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms will guide all cooperation on justice, freedom and security.” Such a 
sentence is absent in Art. 80 of the SAA with Serbia and comparable provisions in other SAAs. 
89
 Art. 2 EU-Ukraine AA. In comparison, Arts. 2 and 3 of the SAA with Serbia only include full cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
as essential elements of the agreement. On the other hand, Art. 2 of the SAA includes a general reference to “respect for 
principles of international law”, which is not in Art. 2 of the EU-Ukraine AA. 
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development and effective multilateralism” are not included in the definition of essential elements.90 
Rather, they are considered to “underpin” the relationship between the parties and are “central to 
enhancing” this relationship.91 In other words, a distinction is made between hard core common values 
related to fundamental rights and security and a range of other general principles that are deemed 
crucial for developing closer relations but which cannot trigger the suspension of the entire 
agreement.
92
 
Market access conditionality 
 
Apart from the more general ‘common values’ conditionality, the EU-Ukraine AA entails a specific 
form of ‘market access’ conditionality, which is explicitly linked to the process of legislative 
approximation. Hence, it is one of the specific mechanisms introduced to tackle the challenges of 
integration without membership. Of particular significance is a far-reaching monitoring of Ukraine’s 
efforts to approximate national legislation to EU law, including aspects of implementation and 
enforcement.
93
 To facilitate the assessment process, the Ukrainian government is obliged to provide 
reports to the EU in line with approximation deadlines specified in the Agreement.
94
 In addition to the 
drafting of progress reports, which is a common practice within the EU’s pre-accession strategy and 
the ENP, the monitoring procedure may include “on-the-spot missions, with the participation of EU 
institutions, bodies and agencies, non-governmental bodies, supervisory authorities, independent 
experts and others as needed.”95 Arguably, the latter option is a new and far-reaching instrument 
introduced precisely to guarantee that legislative approximation goes beyond a formal adaptation of 
national legislation. 
The results of the monitoring activities are to be discussed within the joint bodies established under the 
AA (cf. supra). Such bodies may adopt recommendations on the basis of unanimity but it is only the 
Association Council (or the Trade Committee) which shall decide on further market opening if the 
parties agree that the necessary measures covered within the DCFTA part of the agreement have been 
implemented and are being enforced.
96
 Significantly, recommendations or decisions of the joint 
institutional bodies as well as a failure to reach such recommendations or decisions cannot be 
challenged under the specific DCFTA dispute settlement procedure.
97
 In other words, the ‘market 
opening’ conditionality is very strict. From a legal point of view, it requires the agreement of both 
parties to proceed. Of course, in practice, Ukraine will be the requesting party which places the EU in 
a powerful position to decide on the pace and scope of market opening. 
Because market access conditionality is so closely intertwined with legislative approximation, its key 
mechanisms will be further illustrated in the next chapter on legislative approximation and dispute 
settlement. 
                                                     
90
Art. 3 EU-Ukraine AA. In contrast, Art. 2 of the SAA with Serbia includes the principles of the market economy in the list 
of essential elements. 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Art. 478 EU-Ukraine AA foresees that a suspension of the entire agreement, including the part on Trade and Trade-related 
measures, is only possible in case of violation of the essential elements or in accordance with the general rules of 
international law. 
93
 Art. 475 (2) EU-Ukraine AA. 
94
 Art. 475(2) EU-Ukraine AA. 
95
 Art. 475 (3) EU-Ukraine AA. 
96
 Art. 475 (5) EU-Ukraine AA Sometimes, the decision about market accession is specifically endowed to the Trade 
Committee. This is, for instance, the case with regard to services and establishment (Art. 4 Annex XVII) and public 
procurement (Art. 154). 
97
 Art. 475(6) EU-Ukraine AA. 
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Mechanisms of Legislative Approximation and Dispute Settlement 
In contrast to the PCA, which only includes a very general ‘best endeavour clause’ (cf. supra),98 the 
new AA contains multiple specific provisions on legislative and regulatory approximation including 
detailed annexes specifying the procedure and pace of the approximation process for different policy 
areas.
99
 The various approximation clauses differ in the sense that for some areas the annexes contain 
detailed lists of relevant EU legislation whereas others are more general in nature or even lack a clear 
legal obligation to approximate. To a certain extent, the variation between these approximation 
provisions is the result of the different objectives of each chapter. 
Not surprisingly, the most advanced mechanisms of legislative approximation are to be found in 
chapters related to the establishment of the DCFTA. The AA also includes several mechanisms to deal 
with the dynamic evolution of the incorporated EU acquis as well as sophisticated forms of dispute 
settlement. 
A patchwork of legislative approximation clauses 
Article 474 of the EU-Ukraine AA provides that “Ukraine will carry out gradual approximation of its 
legislation to EU law” as referred to in no less than 44 annexes to the agreement and based on specific 
commitments and mechanisms identified in both the annexes and specific titles to the agreement. 
Separate approximation clauses can be found in Title IV on the DCFTA, Title V on Economic and 
Sector Cooperation and Title VI on Financial Cooperation. Other EU-Ukraine AA Titles contain rather 
general provisions referring to international conventions or “European and international standards”100 
and cannot be considered as approximation clauses sensu stricto because there is no clear obligation to 
incorporate EU legislation. 
In the Title on Economic and Sector Cooperation, most chapters share a similar ‘standard 
approximation clause’ providing that Ukraine shall gradually approximate its legislation to the EU 
acquis as set out in the annex to the chapter concerned.
101
 Each of these annexes provides a list of 
specific EU legislation and a timetable for approximation.
102
 Even though the annexes state that 
Ukraine only “undertakes” to gradually approximate to the selected EU legislation, they provide a 
strict deadline against when the selection of EU acquis “shall be implemented”.103 Other 
                                                     
98
 Largely comparable ‘best endeavour’ clauses are also included in the SAAs and in the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements (EMAAs). Of course, the pre-accession process develops the voluntary nature of the SAA approximation 
clauses into a firm obligation considering Article 49 TEU and the Copenhagen criteria. Regarding the EMAAs, it is 
noteworthy that the nature of the obligation is even softer than under the PCAs as they only prescribe that “cooperation” 
[emphasis added] shall be aimed at helping [the Mediterranean partner] to bring its legislation closer to that of the 
Community” (Art. 52 EMAA Morocco (OJ, 2009, L 107/166) or that the parties “shall use their best endeavours to 
approximate their respective laws [emphasis added] in order to facilitate the implementation of this agreement” (Art. 48 
EMAA Egypt (OJ, 2004, L 304/39)).  
99
 Art. 474 of the EU-Ukraine AA, however, recapitulates the entire scope of Ukraine’s legislative approximation 
commitments “as referred to in Annexes I to XLIV to this Agreement, based on the commitments identified in Titles IV, 
V and VI of this Agreement, and according to the provisions of those Annexes”. 
100
 Art. 15 EU-Ukraine AA. 
101
 Also Title VI on Financial cooperation contains such a standard approximation clause (Art. 459 EU-Ukraine AA).  
102
 Chapter 4 Taxation (Art. 353- Annex XXVIII), Chapter 6 Environment (Art. 363- Annex XXIX), Chapter 7 Transport 
(Art. 368- Annex XXXI), Chapter 13 Company Law, Corporate Governance, Accounting and Auditing (Art. 387- Annex 
XXXIV and XXXV), Chapter 15 Audio Visual Policy (Art. 397- Annex XXXVII), Chapter 20 Consumer Protection 
(Art. 417- Annex XXXVIII), Chapter 21 cooperation on Employment, Social Policy and Equal Opportunities (Art. 424- 
Annex XXXIX) and Chapter 22 Public Health (Art. 428- Annex XL). The approximation clauses of Chapter 12 Financial 
Services (Article 385) and Chapter 14 Information Society (Art. 394) make a cross reference to DCFTA Chapter 6 on 
Establishment, Trade in Services and Electronic Commerce. 
103
 Ibid. 
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approximation clauses in this title are less ambitious as they do not list a selection of EU acquis in an 
annex
104
 or because they lack a firm binding obligation to approximate.
105
 
The most elaborate approximation clauses can be found in Title IV on the establishment of the 
DCFTA. In several DCFTA Chapters, the process of legislative approximation is clearly linked to 
additional access to the EU Internal Market. For example, in the area of technical barriers to trade,
106
 
Ukraine must “incorporate the relevant EU acquis” in line with the timetable set out in Annex III. It is 
only when the “EU Party” has determined that Ukraine has fully approximated its legislation to the 
listed EU acquis that additional access to its Internal Market will be offered in the form of the 
conclusion of an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products 
(ACAA).
107
 Remarkably, Annex III does not contain a clear selection of EU acquis such as in the 
standard approximation clauses but refers to “sectors” of horizontal (framework) and vertical 
(sectoral) legislation. The absence of a precise selection of EU legislation in this Annex can be 
explained by the fact that contracting Parties to an ACAA are still free, to a certain extent, to establish 
and maintain own regulations and standards.
108
 
Similarly, in the area of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Ukraine “shall” approximate its 
sanitary, phytosanitary and animal welfare legislation to that of the EU as set out in Annex V.
109
 In this 
case, the conditional market access offered to Ukraine takes the form of the “determination of 
equivalence”, which means that the EU shall accept, under conditions, Ukraine’s SPS measures as 
equivalent, even if these measures differ from the Union’s standards, and vice versa.110 Again, this 
determination of equivalence will only be initiated once the EU-Ukraine SPS Sub-Committee decides, 
after regular monitoring, that Ukraine’s approximation process, as set out in Annex V, is achieved.111 
Initially, Annex V does not provide a clear list of EU legislation. However, three months after the 
entry into force of the AA, Ukraine must submit a “Comprehensive Strategy” to the SPS Sub-
Committee. This document will be incorporated in Annex V of the EU-Ukraine AA and serve as a 
reference document for the implementation of this Agreement into the legal system of Ukraine.
112
 
The most detailed provisions on legislative approximation are included in DCFTA Chapter 6 on 
Services, Establishment and Electronic Commerce, more specific in its sub-sections on Postal and 
Courier Services, Electronic Communications, Financial Services and International Maritime 
Transport Services.
113
 They all contain the same approximation clause according to which “Ukraine 
shall ensure that its existing laws and future legislation will be gradually made compatible with the EU 
                                                     
104
 Chapter 9 Cooperation in Science and Technology (Art. 375(1) EU-Ukraine AA) and Chapter 18 Fisheries and Maritime 
Policy (Art. 410 EU-Ukraine AA). 
105
 For example, Art. 405 EU-Ukraine AA on Agriculture and Rural Development states that the Parties shall “support” 
gradual approximation to EU legislation. See also Arts. 410 and 435 EU-Ukraine AA for similar non-binding 
approximation clauses. 
106
 Chapter 3 DCFTA, Title IV EU-Ukraine AA. 
107
Art. 57 EU-Ukraine AA.  ACAAs are a specific type of mutual recognition agreements according to which the contracting 
parties agree that products listed in the ACAA, fulfilling the requirements for being lawfully placed on the market of one 
party, may be placed on the market of the other party. See for example the EU-Israel ACAA (OJ, 2013, L 1/2). 
108
 European Commission, ‘Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs)’, 
SEC(2004) 1071, 25 August 2004, p. 6. 
109
 Art. 64(1) EU-Ukraine AA. 
110
 Art. 61(21) EU-Ukraine AA. 
111
 Combined reading of Arts. 64(3), 66(4) and para. 2(B) of Annex IX EU-Ukraine AA. 
112
 Combined reading of Art. 64(4) and Annex V EU-Ukraine AA. This document must be divided into three priority areas as 
foreseen in Annex IV. 
113
 These Sub-Sections, respectively Sub-section 4-7, are part of Section 5 “Regulatory Framework”. 
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acquis”.114 These are the only provisions in the AA explicitly obliging Ukraine also to approximate its 
“future” legislation to the EU acquis. Moreover, these provisions are further fleshed out in Annex 
XVII which defines specific horizontal rules and principles on legislative approximation and a clear 
selection of EU legislation. This annex refers to over more than 80 specific EU Directives and 
Regulations and a strict timetable against when (parts of) these EU acts must be implemented.
115
 The 
annex also contains “General principles and obligations” on legislative approximation which 
determines how the listed EU legislation will be made binding upon the Parties and “made part of 
Ukraine’s internal legal order”.116 Reflecting but not copying Article 288 TFEU, Article 2 of this 
Annex specifies that an act in this Annex corresponding to an EU Regulation or Decision “shall as 
such be made part of the internal legal order of Ukraine” whereas an act corresponding to an EU 
Directive “shall leave to the authorities of Ukraine the choice of form and method of 
implementation”.117 This provision only appears in a limited number of integration agreements and 
was first used in the EEA Agreement.
118
 The difference, of course, is that in the case of the EU-
Ukraine AA, this provision only applies to a limited part of the annexed EU acquis (i.e. Annex XVII). 
Also similar to the EEA Agreement are the “Horizontal Adaptations and Procedural Rules”,119 which 
stipulate which adaptations must be made to the EU acts listed in this Annex in order to be 
implemented in Ukraine’s legal system.120 
The reason for this far-reaching parallelism with the EEA Agreement is that legal approximation in 
this particular field will lead to the granting of “internal market treatment”. This unprecedented access 
to the EU Internal Market means that juridical persons of Ukraine will have the same freedom of 
establishment and will be able to provide services in the EU as juridical persons of EU Member 
States.
121
 Again, this internal market treatment goes hand in hand with strict market access 
conditionality: it will only be granted to the services concerned if the Trade Committee decides, after a 
strict monitoring procedure, that Ukraine has achieved its legislative approximation commitments.
122
 
The monitoring procedure, clearly inspired by the Union’s pre-accession policy, requires that Ukraine 
submits for each sector roadmaps, progress reports and “transposition tables” to the Commission to 
prove the correct application of its approximation obligations.
123
 
The last DCFTA Chapter that contains a clear legislative approximation obligation linked to additional 
market access is public procurement. Ukraine is obliged to make its public procurement legislation 
“compatible” with the EU public procurement acquis”.124 In return, after a positive evaluation of the 
Trade Committee, Ukraine and the EU will grant access to contract award procedures to companies of 
the other Party pursuant to their procurement rules under treatment no less favourable than that 
                                                     
114
 Respectively Arts. 114, 124, 133 and 138 EU-Ukraine AA. The latter has however a slightly more nuanced formulation. 
115
 Appendix XVII-2 to XVII-5 EU-Ukraine AA. 
116
 Art. 2 Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA. 
117
 In the EU, a Regulation is “directly applicable” in all the Member States whereas acts listed in the Annex corresponding 
to an EU Regulations (or Decision) “must be made part” of Ukraine’s legal order, which means that the act still has to be 
transposed into Ukraine’s legal system. 
118
 Art. 7 EEA. See also Art. 3 ECAA. 
119
 Appendix XVII-1 EU-Ukraine AA contains horizontal adaptations regarding, inter alia, specific terminology of EU acts, 
references to Member States, territories and institutions and the entry into force of the relevant acts. 
120
 In the EEA Agreement, the “Horizontal Adaptations” are added to the Agreement in Protocol 1. Also the ECAA contains 
such “Horizontal adaptations and certain Procedural Rules” (Annex II ECAA).   
121
 Art. 4(3) Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA. 
122
 Ibid.  
123
 Appendix XVII-6 EU-Ukraine AA. 
124
 Art. 153 EU-Ukraine AA. 
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accorded to its own companies.
125
 Again, this constitutes “an unprecedented example in allowing 
possible access of Ukraine, as a non EEA Member to EU Public Procurement Market”.126 The scope of 
EU public procurement legislation to which Ukraine must approximate is listed in Annex XXI and 
focuses on Public Procurement Directives 2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC.
127
 However, these Directives 
do not have to be incorporated in their entirety and at once. This Annex dissects these Directives in 
“Basic Elements”, “Mandatory Elements”, “Non-mandatory Elements” and “Provisions outside the 
scope of the process of legislative approximation” and provides an indicative time schedule with five 
phases, each indicating the scope of EU legislation to be approximated and the specific type of market 
access which will be granted. The Trade Committee shall evaluate each phase and the reciprocal 
granting of market access will only take place after a positive assessment by that Committee.
128
 It is 
clear that the drafters of this agreement envisaged with this procedure an incremental approach for 
legislative approximation in order to support the effective implementation of Ukraine’s approximation 
obligations. 
Finally, the DCFTA contains several other approximation clauses of which the fulfilment is not 
directly linked to additional market access. For example, in the area of competition, Ukraine must 
approximate its competition laws to the selected EU acquis, listed in Article 256 of the agreement.
129
 
Also noteworthy is the DCFTA Chapter on Trade-Related Energy.
130
 Regarding transport of electricity 
and gas, Ukraine must adapt the selection of EU legislation listed in Annex XXVII. Interesting is that 
this Annex incorporates several of Ukraine’s approximation obligations under the EnC Treaty and, 
moreover, even goes beyond that by including EU legislation on areas such as energy efficiency and 
nuclear energy.
131
 In the event of a conflict between the DCFTA Trade-Related Energy provisions and 
the EnC Treaty, the provisions of the EnC Treaty prevail.
132
 Other approximation clauses can be found 
in the area of Customs and Trade Facilitation,
133
 and Trade and Sustainable Development.
134
 
Hence, it is obvious that the EU-Ukraine AA includes a very complex and sophisticated patchwork of 
legislative approximation mechanisms which differ from other existing models of integration without 
membership. First, in comparison to the Swiss model of sectoral bilateral arrangements or the 
multilateral sectoralism of the EnC Treaty and the ECAA, the EU-Ukraine AA incorporates several 
different sectoral approximation mechanisms in a single legal instrument. Second, the various 
legislative approximation mechanisms included in the EU-Ukraine AA differ in scope and nature 
depending on the envisaged level of integration and market opening. Only in those areas where full 
internal market treatment is foreseen, such as in services and establishment, the arrangement is 
comparable to the mechanism for legislative approximation under the EEA. Third, in comparison to 
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 Art. 154 EU-Ukraine AA. 
126
 European Commission, op. cit., footnote 41.  
127
 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures 
for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, OJ, 2004, L 134/114 and 
Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ, 2004, L 134/1. 
128
 Annex XXI EU-Ukraine AA. The Trade Committee shall only proceed to the evaluation of a next phase once the 
measures to implement the previous phase have been carried (Art. 153(3) EU-Ukraine AA). 
129
 It is remarkable that the list of the EU competition acquis that must be approximated by Ukraine is incorporated in the 
body of the agreement (Art. 256 EU-Ukraine AA), and not in an Annex. This implies that he Association Council cannot 
amend this selection of EU acquis according to Article 463 EU-Ukraine AA (cf. infra). 
130
 Chapter 11 DCFTA. 
131
 Annex XXVII EU-Ukraine AA. 
132
 Art. 278(1) EU-Ukraine AA. Art. 278(2) EU-Ukraine AA also foresees that, in implementing this section, preference 
shall be given to the adoption of EnC Treaty-consistent legislation. 
133
 Art. 84 EU-Ukraine AA. 
134
 Art. 290(2) EU-Ukraine AA. 
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the EEA model, the EU-Ukraine arrangement for legislative approximation does not provide for the 
creation of a homogenous and dynamic legal space. Rather, it offers an alternative model based on 
strict market access conditionality.
135
  
It is noteworthy that in the AA, and especially in the DCFTA, different legal terms are used 
interchangeably and inconsistently to refer to the process of legislative approximation. Almost every 
DCFTA Chapter uses different terminology in its approximation clauses. This results in a mishmash of 
legal concepts and obligations according to which Ukraine must “approximate to”, “align to” or 
“achieve conformity with” the EU acquis or make its domestic legislation “compatible” with the EU 
acquis or “incorporate” it in its domestic legal order.136 Moreover, one single DCFTA provision can 
include several different approximation terms.
137
 The main reason for this inconsistency appears that 
the different DCFTA chapters were negotiated by different negotiating teams of DG Trade or other 
Commission DGs, using each their own legal vocabulary to define these approximation obligations.
138
 
Because all these different terms refer to the same process, a more horizontal and consistent use of 
these terms, including precise definitions, would have been beneficial for the legal clarity of this 
agreement.
139
 
Procedures to amend or update the incorporated EU acquis  
Due to the constant evolution of EU law, applying a selection of EU acquis is for a third country as 
shooting on a moving target. Moreover, it could be that the Parties want to broaden the level of 
integration at a later stage and, therefore, envisage extending the selection of the incorporated EU 
acquis. In other words, a crucial challenge for the EU-Ukraine AA, and by extension for all EU 
integration agreements, is to keep the agreement up to date and in line with the evolving EU 
legislation. This can be based on either ‘dynamic’ or ‘static’ mechanisms depending on whether or not 
there is an obligation to adopt automatically every amendment to the EU acquis that is covered under 
the agreement.
140
 
The most developed dynamic model for keeping track with changes in EU legislation is certainly 
incorporated in the EEA Agreement. Pursuant to Article 102 EEA, every modification to the EU 
acquis covered by the scope of this agreement must be discussed within the EEA Joint Committee, 
which shall amend the relevant EEA annexes in order to allow a simultaneous application of 
legislation in the entire EEA. A more static approach to the obligation of legislative approximation can 
be found in the EnC Treaty, which provides that the Energy Community “may take measures to 
implement amendments to the acquis” in the form of a decision or a recommendation of the 
                                                     
135
 When comparing the EU-Ukraine AA with the EEA, it should be noted that the latter is “an international treaty sui 
generis which contains a distinct legal order of its own [and which] goes beyond what is usual for an agreement under 
public international law” (EFTA Court, Erla Maria Sveinbjörnsdòttir v. Government of Iceland, Case E-9/97, 1998, para 
95).  
136
 See, for example, respectively, Arts. 64(1), 56(5), 56(1), 153(1) and Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA. 
137
 For example, Art. 56 AA refers to process of “achieving conformity with”, “approximation to”, “incorporating into the 
legislation of Ukraine” and “aligning with” the annexed EU TBT acquis. 
138
 Interview EEAS official, 22 April 2014; Interview DG Trade official, 12 June 2013. 
139
 For an analysis of this ‘approximation terminology’, see A. Matta, ‘Differentiating the methods of acquis export – the 
case of the Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia’, in P. Van Elsuwege, R. Petrov (Eds.), op. cit. supra, footnote 9, pp. 21-
45. 
140
 For the difference between static and dynamic procedures, see A. Lazowski, op. cit. supra note 9, 1444. A dynamic 
procedure does not mean that that every modification at the level of the EU law must automatically be transposed to the 
Agreement, however, the parties must at least consider to do so. Nevertheless, in some cases, the refusal to update the 
incorporated EU acquis can lead to the (partial) suspension or termination of the agreement (e.g. Art. 102(5) EEA)). 
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Ministerial Committee (or Permanent High Level Group provided it is authorised by the Ministerial 
Committee).
141
 
Again, the EU-Ukraine AA differs from other models of integration without membership. There is no 
single mechanism to amend the incorporated EU acquis, covering the entire agreement, but many 
different ones, varying from ‘static’ to ‘dynamic’ procedures. 
According to Article 463(3) AA, the Association Council “may” update or amend the Annexes to the 
Agreement “[to take] into account the evolution of EU law”, without prejudice to any specific 
provisions included in the DCFTA. In addition, the Association Council will also be the forum for 
exchange of information on EU and Ukrainian legislative acts, “both under preparation and in force”. 
Because this allows the Ukrainian administrations to be consulted and to express their opinions and 
concerns on draft amendments of relevant legislation, this procedure can be considered as a limited 
form of “decision-shaping”. However, this Article can hardly be seen as a dynamic procedure since 
the Association Council is not obliged to consider updating the Annexes to each and every 
modification of relevant EU legislation. Moreover, because the Association Council, which comprises 
both EU and Ukrainian representatives, must take decisions “by agreement”, Ukraine can always veto 
this process.
142
 
Specific provisions in several DCFTA Chapters go beyond this general clause of Article 463(3) EU-
Ukraine AA. For example, Annex XVII to the Chapter on Services and Establishment contains a more 
elaborate dynamic procedure to amend the EU acquis included in this Annex. Different procedures are 
applicable before and after internal market treatment is granted in a specific sector. In the former case, 
“in order to guarantee legal certainty”, the EU must inform Ukraine and the Trade Committee 
regularly on all new or amended relevant legislation. Then, the Trade Committee “shall” add within 
three months “any” new or amended EU legislation to the Annex,143 which implies that Ukraine 
cannot refuse to update the annexes.
144
 In the case internal market treatment is already granted, not 
automatically all amendments or new legislation must be added to the Annex as the Trade Committee 
can still decide whether or not to add them.
145
 Nevertheless, if no agreement can be reached on the 
inclusion of new or amended EU legislation, the EU may decide to suspend the granting of internal 
market treatment in the sector concerned.
146
 A more static procedure can be found in the area of public 
procurement. Here, Ukraine is obliged to take “due account147 […] of any modifications of the EU 
acquis” in the process of legislative approximation.148 Hence, even within the DCFTA part of the EU-
Ukraine AA, various updating procedures are foreseen, again depending on the level of integration 
with the EU Internal Market and the objectives of each specific chapter. 
Dispute Settlement and the role of (the case law) of the Court of Justice 
The complex nature of the EU-Ukraine AA is also reflected in the provisions on dispute settlement. 
For disputes concerning the interpretation, application or implementation of the AA, a standard 
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) is provided according to which the Association Council can 
                                                     
141
 Arts. 25, 47, 53 and 76 EnC Treaty. 
142
 Combined reading of Arts. 462(1) and 463(1) EU-Ukraine AA. 
143
 Art. 3 Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA. 
144
 However, the Trade Committee may decide whether Ukraine, under exceptional circumstances, can be “partly and 
temporarily” exempted from transposing this new or amended EU acquis (Art. 3(3) Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA). 
145
 Art. 5 Annex XVII EU-Ukraine AA. 
146
 Art. 5(5) Annex XVII AA. This provision is similar to Article 102(5) EEA. 
147
 Emphasis added. 
148
 Art. 153(2) EU-Ukraine AA (emphasis added). 
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settle disputes by way of a binding decision.
149
 If an agreement cannot be reached in the Association 
Council after three months, the complaining Party is allowed to take “appropriate measures”.150 For 
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of provisions of the DCFTA (Title IV), a separate 
and more elaborate DSM is established.
151
 This DSM is modelled upon the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding and is included in most of the recent EU FTAs.
152
 It foresees, after a consultation 
period, in the establishment of an arbitration panel which shall rule on the dispute. Rulings of the 
arbitration panel are binding
153
 and each Party must take any measure necessary to comply with 
them.
154
 If the Party complained against fails to take such measures without offering a temporary 
compensation, the other Party is entitled to suspend obligations arising from the DCFTA “at a level 
equivalent to the nullification or impairment caused by the violation”.155 In the light of the recent gas-
conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and its impact of several eastern EU Member States, the 
DCFTA DSM establishes shorter procedures regarding disputes concerning an interruption of any 
transport of natural gas, oil, or electricity or a threat thereof.
156
 Moreover, for several DCFTA 
Chapters, a mediation mechanism is provided.
157
 
Significantly, the DCFTA part of the agreement also includes a unique DSM relating to legislative 
approximation (Article 322 EU-Ukraine AA). This procedure only applies to disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of provisions relating to legislative approximation in a limited number 
of DCFTA Chapters, “or which otherwise imposes upon a Party an obligation defined by reference to 
a provision of EU law”.158 If a dispute in relation to one of those chapters concerns a question of 
interpretation of a provision of EU law, the arbitration panel shall not decide the question, “but request 
the Court of Justice of the European Union to give a ruling on the question”, which will be binding on 
the arbitration panel.
159
 This provision is unique in the sense that in no other agreement, concluded by 
the EU, an arbitration panel is given the competence to ask for a preliminary ruling to the Court of 
Justice. In a limited number of other EU integration agreements, the Court of Justice can respond to 
preliminary questions from a national court or tribunal.
160
 
                                                     
149
 Art. 477 EU-Ukraine AA. 
150
 Art. 478 EU-Ukraine AA. 
151
 Chapter 14 DCFTA. Significantly, this DSM does not exclude action under the WTO framework. Yet, Art. 324 precludes 
parallel actions for identical obligations under the AA and under the WTO agreement. 
152
 See for example Art. 14 EU-Korea FTA, (OJ, 2011, L 127/6). For analysis, see I. G. Bercero, ‘Dispute Settlement in 
European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lessons Learned?, in L. Bartels, F. Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and the 
WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), pp. 383-406. 
153
 The agreement precludes, however, that rulings of the arbitration panel acquire direct effect (Art. 231(2) EU-Ukraine 
AA). 
154
 Art. 311 EU-Ukraine AA. 
155
 Art. 315(2) EU-Ukraine AA. According to Art. 478(2) AA, the denunciation of the Agreement not sanctioned by the 
general rules of international law or the violation of the essential elements of Article 2 AA can also lead to the suspension 
of DCFTA rights or obligations. 
156
 Arts. 307(8), 308(4) 309, 310(3) and 314 EU-Ukraine AA. 
157
 Chapter 15 DCFTA of the EU-Ukraine AA. 
158
 The Chapters of the EU-Ukraine AA are Technical Barriers to Trade (Chapter 3), Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(Chapter 4), Customs and Trade Facilitation (Chapter 5), Establishment, Trade in Services and Electronic Commerce 
(Chapter 6), Public Procurement (Chapter 8) and Competition (Chapter 10). 
159
 Art. 322(2) EU-Ukraine AA. 
160
 For instance, Art. 107 and Protocol 34 EEA Agreement. Also the ECAA Agreement, inspired by the EEA model, 
foresees, under certain conditions, the possibility for national courts or tribunals of the ECAA Partners to ask the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling (see Art. 16(2) and Annex IV ECAA). 
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The procedure of Article 322 EU-Ukraine AA is crucial to preserve the Court of Justice’s exclusive 
jurisdiction to interpret the EU acquis.
161
 It is settled case law that the EU and its Member States are 
not bound by a particular interpretation of rules of EU law, referred to in an agreement which 
“extends” the EU acquis to third countries such as the EEA and the ECAA.162 In Opinion 1/91 on the 
draft EEA Agreement, the Court of Justice also clarified that the interpretation of EU rules cannot be 
entrusted to bodies created on the basis of international agreements.
163
 In order to avoid a repetition of 
the EEA saga, Article 322 EU-Ukraine AA precludes the arbitration panel to give a binding ruling on 
the interpretation of the agreement’s provisions which are essentially rules of EU law by delegating 
disputes on “a question of interpretation of a provision of EU law” to the Court of Justice by means of 
a preliminary ruling.
164
 
In addition to this preliminary ruling procedure, the EU-Ukraine AA includes specific provisions 
guaranteeing the uniform interpretation of legal norms. It is well known that similar provisions in 
international agreements and in EU law do not automatically have the same meaning but that the 
objective, purpose and context of the agreement needs to be taken into account.
165
 Of course, the 
situation is different when express provisions on identical interpretation are laid down in an agreement 
itself.
166
 It is noteworthy that several DCFTA Chapters contain such explicit provisions. The most 
straightforward obligation can be found, somewhat hidden, in the annex to the Services and 
Establishment Chapter. Article 6 of Annex XVII states that: 
“[i]nsofar as the provisions of this Annex and the applicable provisions specified in the 
Appendices are identical in substance to corresponding [EU provisions], those provisions shall, in 
their implementation and application, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union”. 
Such a provision is also incorporated in other agreements such as in the EEA Agreement, however, 
Article 6 EEA Agreement only refers to the case law developed prior to the signature of the EEA 
Agreement. With regard to the post-signature case law, Article 105(3) EEA Agreement provides that 
“[t]he EEA Joint Committee shall keep under constant review the development of the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities and the EFTA Court. To this end judgments of these 
Courts shall be transmitted to the EEA Joint Committee which shall act so as to preserve the 
homogeneous interpretation of the Agreement.”167 Article 322 EU-Ukraine AA does not make such a 
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 Art. 19 TEU. For analysis, see I. Govaere, ‘Beware of the Trojan Horse: Dispute Settlement in (Mixed) Agreements and 
the autonomy of the EU Legal Order’, in C. Hillion, P. Koutrakos (Eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited (Hart Publishing, 
2010), 192-199. 
162
 Opinion 1/00, Proposed agreement between the European Community and non-Member states on the establishment of a 
European Common Aviation Area, [2002], ECR 3493, para. 3 and 11. 
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 Court of Justice, Opinion 1/91, Ibid, para. 14. See also Case 270/80 Polydor v Harlequin, [1982], ECR 329, para. 15-19. 
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 Court of Justice, Case C-351/08, Christian Grimme v Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse, [2009], ECR 10777, para. 29; 
Case C-547/10, Swiss Confederation v European Commission, [2013], not yet published, para. 80. 
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 Art. 3(2) of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and Court of 
Justice further states that in the interpretation and application of the EEA Agreement, the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
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distinction between pre-signature and post-signature case law.
168
 Of course, another major difference 
with the EEA Agreement is that in the case of the EU-Ukraine AA this obligation of consistent 
interpretation only applies to a specific DCFTA chapter and not to the entire agreement.
169
 
Constitutional challenges for the implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA 
After the long and difficult process leading to the signature and conclusion of the EU-Ukraine AA, 
significant challenges for the effective implementation of this ambitious legal framework need to be 
addressed. Three issues can be distinguished: the implications of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the 
status of the AA and decisions of the Association Council in the Ukrainian legal system and the 
potential direct effect of the AA in the EU legal order. 
The Crimea question and the territorial scope of the AA 
The text of the EU-Ukraine AA was already initialed before the Russian annexation of Crimea.
170
 
Consequently, this issue and its impact on the territorial scope of application of the AA are not 
addressed in the text of the agreement. Nevertheless, the question has important implications, in 
particular for the DCFTA part and the determination of the rules of origin.
171
 
According to the European Council, the EU “strongly condemns the illegal annexation of Crimea and 
Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and will not recognise it”.172 Consequently, it can be argued that 
products from the Crimea region are by the EU still considered to be goods originating in Ukraine and, 
therefore, benefit from the preferential trade regime foreseen in the DCFTA or in the EU’s 
autonomous trade preferences. However, in practice, only Russian authorities will be able to issue the 
relevant origin certificates for products manufactured or processed in Crimea. As confirmed by the 
Court of Justice, the EU cannot accept the proof of origin issued by authorities other than those 
designed by name in the relevant (preferential) agreement.
173
 Because there are no competent customs 
authorities in Crimea to establish the origin of the goods as ‘Ukrainian’, the products can de facto not 
benefit from preferential treatment of the DCFTA. Meanwhile, the European Council has asked the 
Commission to evaluate the legal consequences of the annexation of Crimea and to propose economic, 
trade and financial restrictions regarding Crimea for rapid implementation.
174
 On a proposal by the 
Commission, the Council made a first step in this regard on 23 June 2014 when it prohibited the 
import of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol into the EU. However, goods originating in 
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Crimea or Sevastopol, which have been granted a certificate of origin by Ukrainian authorities, may 
still be imported into the EU.
175
 Moreover, in the Final Act between the EU and Ukraine as regards the 
EU-Ukraine AA, the parties agree that the AA:  
“shall apply to the entire territory of Ukraine as recognised under international law and shall 
engage in consultations with a view to determine the effects of the Agreement with regard to the 
illegally annexed territory of the Autonomous republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol in 
which the Ukrainian Government currently does not exercise effective control”
176
 
In this regard, it must be noted that also the rules of origin in the Moldova and Georgia DCFTA do not 
include specific rules on the goods originating in these countries’ ‘breakaway regions’ (Transnistria 
/Abkhazia and South Ossetia), despite the fact that these situations already existed at the time of 
negotiating these agreements.
177
 Nevertheless, both agreements include a specific general provision on 
the “territorial application” of these AAs and DCFTAs.178According to these provisions, the AAs will 
apply “to the territory of [the Republic of Moldova/Georgia]”, however, they include specific 
paragraphs on the territorial application of their respective DCFTAs. It is stated that the application of 
the DCFTA in relation to those areas “over which the Government of [Georgia/Moldova] does not 
exercise effective control, shall commence once [Georgia/Moldova] ensures the full implementation 
and enforcement of this Agreement, or of [its DCFTA], respectively, on its entire territory”.179 The 
Association Council shall adopt a decision when “the full implementation and enforcement” of the AA 
or DCFTA on the entire territory of Georgia or Moldova is ensured. This implies that both parties, 
including the EU, must agree and confirm that Georgia or Moldova exercise effective control over 
these areas and are capable to implement the AAs and DCFTAs in these areas.
180
 Conversely, if a 
party considers that the implementation and enforcement cannot be guaranteed in these areas, the 
application of the DCFTA can be suspended in relation to the areas concerned.
181
 These procedures do 
not only relate to trade in goods and tariff reduction but to the entire scope of the DCFTAs. 
Accordingly, in these procedures, the EU-Moldova or EU-Georgia Association Council can only take 
a decision to suspend or apply the entire DCFTA and cannot only cover parts thereof.
182
 A similar 
solution may be expected to apply in relation to the territorial scope of the EU-Ukraine AA.  
Ukraine regards the territory of Crimea as ‘temporary occupied territory’ and continues to consider the 
Ukrainian Constitution and legal system applicable therein.
183
 It means that residents of Crimea and 
Sevastopol holding Ukrainian citizenship (and Russian citizenship if it was issued automatically 
without consent of an Ukrainian national) may enjoy rights under the EU-Ukraine AA on the same 
basis as the Ukrainian nationals. The status of Ukrainian companies established in Crimea and 
Sevastopol is not defined yet. However, it goes without doubt that a future Law on Implementation of 
the EU-Ukraine AA must determine the status of Ukrainian nationals and companies residing in 
Crimea and Sevastopol with regard to application of the AA in detail. 
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The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Ukrainian Constitution 
The implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA creates important challenges from the perspective of 
Ukrainian constitutional law. According to Article 9 of the 1996 Constitution: 
International treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada [Parliament] of 
Ukraine, are part of the national legislation of Ukraine. 
The conclusion of international treaties that contravene the Constitution of Ukraine is possible 
only after introducing relevant amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine.
184
 
This provision implies that, after ratification, the EU-Ukraine AA will be an integral part of the 
Ukrainian legal order. Pursuant to Article 19(2) of the “law on international treaties of Ukraine”, it 
will enjoy priority over conflicting national legislation.
185
 However, this is not the case if there is a 
conflict with the provisions of the Ukrainian constitution. In this respect, it is noteworthy that some of 
the EU-Ukraine AA provisions impose commitments on Ukraine that directly contradict the national 
constitution. For instance, Article 8 AA binds Ukraine to ratify and implement the Rome Statute on 
the International Criminal Court and its related instruments. However, in a judgment of 11 July 2001, 
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine concluded that several provisions of the Rome Statute were not in 
conformity with the national Constitution.
186
 Consequently, the ratification of the Rome Statute on the 
International Criminal Court by the Verkhovna Rada is only possible after a constitutional revision and 
a positive ruling of the Constitutional Court.
187
 Another issue concerns the approximation of Ukrainian 
legislation to the dynamic EU acquis. Taking into account that Ukrainian institutions are not involved 
in the decision-making process of EU legislation, the question arises to what extent this can be 
reconciled with fundamental constitutional principles such as legality and sovereignty.
188
 
One of the major problems to be solved in the course of implementation and application of the EU-
Ukraine AA is the lack of direct enforceability of international agreements in the Ukrainian legal 
order.
189
 In particular, the question arises how binding decisions of the Association Council will be 
applied in Ukraine. The Ukrainian legal system has never experienced the necessity to apply binding 
decisions of institutions established under the framework of an international agreement. This challenge 
has been faced by other associated countries too. For instance, in 2001 the Croatian Parliament ratified 
the SAA and at the same time enacted the Act on Implementation of the SAA which required 
implementation of all ‘association’ acquis but did not envisage its direct effect within the Croatian 
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legal order.
190
 The Norwegian Parliament adopted a statutory law on implementation of the EEA 
Agreement in 1992. This law granted provisions of the EEA Agreement and its secondary law 
supremacy over conflicting national legislation. The Norwegian law on implementation of the EEA 
Agreement clarified that relevant EU Regulations are to be implemented without change but the 
implementation of EU Directives must take into account choice of form and method of 
implementation.
191
 In order to ensure effective application of the relevant EU acquis within the myriad 
of sectoral agreements with the EU, Switzerland adopted several implementation laws too. For 
example, the Swiss Federal Law on Internal Market mirrors most of the relevant EU legislation and 
the Swiss Law on Federal Parliament ensures “euro compatibility” of Swiss law drafts with the EU 
acquis.
192
 
Hence, the adoption of a special implementation law clarifying the implications of the EU-Ukraine 
AA for the application and interpretation of national legislation is a crucial prerequisite to tackle most 
challenges of legislative approximation. It is noteworthy that Ukraine has already gained some 
experience in ensuring the implementation of international norms after the ratification of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1997. The incorporation of the ensuing obligations took 
place by means of two laws. The first was a law on ratification of the ECHR wherein Ukraine 
recognised the jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR).
193
 The second was a 
special law on the application of case law of the ECtHR in Ukraine. It imposed on Ukraine a duty of 
mandatory and timely execution of all ECtHR judgments.
194
 In accordance with these laws judgments 
of the ECtHR are being formally accepted by the national judiciary as sources of law and Ukrainian 
judges frequently refer to the ECtHR judgments in their decisions. However, the rate of effective 
application of the ECtHR case law in Ukraine is considered as unsatisfactory and lags far behind other 
European countries.
195
 
Another relevant tool to reconcile the EU-Ukraine AA with national constitutional requirements is the 
so-called ‘Euro-friendly interpretation’ of national legislation. This is a common practice in most 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkan region.
196
 For instance, in 1997 the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal rejected the binding force of EU law provisions in the EU-Poland AA 
within the Polish legal order but acknowledged the obligation of the Polish government and judiciary 
to interpret “the existing legislation in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible degree of such 
compatibility”.197 The Czech Constitutional Court emphasised the special importance of EU law for 
the Czech legal system and frequently cited the EU acquis including the Court of Justice case law in 
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its jurisprudence.
198
 Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court will have a chance to rule on the 
Euro-friendly interpretation of the EU-Ukraine AA within the national legal order and refer to 
experiences of other associate countries which either already joined the EU or are on the pre-accession 
track. Another solution could be an amendment of the Ukrainian Constitution in order to ensure direct 
enforceability of the EU-Ukraine AA. In 2001, both the Czech and Slovak republics made 
international law directly enforceable in their domestic legal systems by amending their respective 
constitutions.
199
 However, it is unlikely that Ukraine will introduce new amendments that imply at 
least a minimal limitation of national sovereignty. Such a scenario is politically sensitive taking into 
account that a threat to national sovereignty was one of the reasons for rejecting the offer to take part 
in the Eurasian customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Be that as it may, the EU-
Ukraine AA will stimulate a process of constitutional reform, not only to accommodate the 
relationship with international and European law but also to comply with the ambitious objectives of 
political association, economic integration and legislative approximation with the EU. The scope of 
the EU acquis to be adopted by Ukraine is massive and covers not only EU legislation but also EU 
fundamental principles, doctrines and the Court of Justice case law. In addition to formal legislative 
amendments, Ukrainian civil servants and judges will require in depth training in EU law in order to 
be able to apply the approximated legislation in their everyday activities. 
The question of direct effect in the EU legal order 
The issue of direct applicability of the EU-Ukraine AA not only concerns the constitutional system of 
Ukraine but is also of particular importance within the legal order of the EU. Over the years, the Court 
of Justice has developed a consistent practice of accepting the direct effect of bilateral agreements on 
the condition that the provisions invoked are clear and unconditional.
200
 Only if the agreement 
contains a formulation excluding the direct applicability of the agreement or the direct effect of some 
its provisions, the situation is different. The latter is the case for the EU-Ukraine AA. For instance, 
chapter 14 on the specific dispute settlement mechanism in relation to the DCFTA part of the 
agreement explicitly provides that “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, this Title shall not be construed as 
conferring rights or imposing obligations which can be directly invoked before the domestic courts of 
the Parties.” Arguably, the introduction of such a statement was deemed necessary to ensure 
consistency with the multilateral dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, which does not have 
direct effect in the EU’s legal order.201 The same logic applies with regard to the inclusion of 
references that certain specific commitments laid down in annexes to the agreement “shall have no 
self-executing effect and thus confer no rights directly on natural or legal persons.”202 This practice, 
which can also be observed in other recently concluded EU free trade agreements, avoids the 
possibility to circumvent the non-direct effect of WTO commitments.
203
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Significantly, in addition to the specific clauses precluding direct effect of the AA’s trade dispute 
settlement mechanism and the WTO-like commitments in the field of establishment and services, the 
Council Decisions on the signing and provisional application of the AA unequivocally provide that 
“[t]he Agreement shall not be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations which can be 
directly invoked before Union or Member State courts or tribunals.”204 The question arises to what 
extent such a unilateral declaration, which is not part of the agreement itself, precludes the direct effect 
of the AA’s clear and unconditional provisions. This issue is particularly relevant with regard to the 
non-discrimination clause of Article 17(1) EU-Ukraine AA, which provides that “[s]ubject to the laws, 
conditions and procedures applicable in each Member State and the EU, treatment accorded to 
workers who are Ukrainian nationals and who are legally employed in the territory of a Member State 
shall be free of any discrimination based on nationality, as regards working conditions, remuneration 
or dismissal, compared to the nationals of that Member State”. In the Simutenkov judgment, the Court 
of Justice concluded that an identically worded provision of the PCA with Russia “has direct effect, 
with the result that individuals to whom that provision applies are entitled to rely on it before the 
courts of the Member States.”205 Precluding a similar right for Ukrainian nationals would, therefore, 
lead to a very paradoxical situation. It would imply that an old PCA with Russia having relatively 
limited ambitions of partnership would have more far-reaching direct legal implications than a far 
more ambitious association agreement with Ukraine.
206
 
Remarkably, the Council could have easily avoided the legal uncertainty regarding the direct effect of 
the non-discrimination clause without opening the door to direct effect of the other (trade-related) 
provisions. As noted above, a separate ‘split’ Council Decision was adopted for Article 17 EU-
Ukraine AA. This Council Decision gave the Council the option not to unilaterally exclude direct 
effect of this provision, however, instead it chose to do so by including the same provision as in the 
‘general’ Council Decision for the conclusion of the AA which excludes direct effect.207 
Even though it appears difficult for the Court of Justice to ignore the clear-cut instructions of the 
Council, the implications for the direct effect of the EU-Ukraine AA are not straightforward. As 
Advocate General Saggio observed in his Opinion in Portugal v Council “[i]t need hardly be stated 
that a unilateral interpretation of the agreement made in the context of an internal adoption procedure 
cannot – outside the system of reservations – limit the effects of the agreement itself.”208 Arguably, the 
objective content of the textual provisions of the agreement takes priority over wishes expressed in 
separate unilateral declarations. This seems in line with the rules of customary international law, 
according to which “a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. 
The text of the treaty is the primary source of interpretation, while external aids such as travaux 
prépratoires constitute a supplementary source.”209 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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Concluding Remarks 
Taking into account the comprehensive nature of the agreement, the underlying conditionality 
approach and the complex mechanisms for legislative approximation and dispute settlement, the EU-
Ukraine AA occupies, together with the Moldova and Georgia AAs, a unique position within the 
network of bilateral agreements concluded between the EU and third countries. 
It is a truly innovative legal instrument in the EU’s external relations practice based on 
comprehensiveness, complexity and conditionality. The EU-Ukraine AA does not go as far as the EEA 
Agreement, which extends the entire EU Internal Market acquis to the participating EFTA States on 
the basis of homogeneity. Yet, in certain specific areas where full internal market treatment is 
foreseen, such as in several sections on services and establishment, certain arrangements under the 
EU-Ukraine AA are comparable to the mechanism for legislative approximation under the EEA 
Agreement. A key difference, of course, is the far-reaching market accession conditionality as 
foreseen under the EU-Ukraine AA. Based upon a strict monitoring process, apparently inspired by the 
pre-accession methodology, not only the process of legislative approximation but also – and most 
importantly – the effective enforcement and implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA is subject to 
permanent scrutiny. This market access conditionality illustrates that the EU is very cautious to open 
up its Internal Market for third countries which have a less stable political and economic system than 
the EEA countries.  
As an innovative legal instrument, the EU-Ukraine AA also fundamentally differs from other 
agreements with the EU’s neighbouring countries. It creates a single legal framework opposed to the 
Swiss model of sectoral bilateralism and it is not sector-specific such as the multilateral EnC Treaty or 
the ECAA. Rather, the EU-Ukraine AA incorporates certain bits and pieces derived from other 
agreements and policies. Accordingly, it forms a new type of integration without membership, with all 
legal complexities this entails.  
 
 
  
 
